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STANDING TO SUE IN ANTITRUST CASES:
THE OFFENSIVE USE OF PASSING-ON
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 4 of the Clayton Act' authorizes a private right of
action for violation of the antitrust laws. It is clear and simple
on its face:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
A two-part standing test with seeming general application
has been promulgated by the Supreme Court. The first part is
the traditional "case or controversy" requirement. 2 The second
part provides that if "injury in fact" is alleged, an individual
has standing to sue when "the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guar-
antee in question. '3 In the antitrust context the Court has stated
that the antitrust laws were designed to
protect the victims of the forbidden practices as well as
the public .... Furthermore, Congress itself has placed
the private antitrust litigant in a most favorable posi-
tion through the enactment of § 5 of the Clayton Act.
... In the face of such a policy this Court should not
add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond
what is specifically set forth by Congress in those laws.4
Given the Act and the Supreme Court's general statements about
standing and the purpose of the Act, it would seem that a liberal
1 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
2 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
3 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
I Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
STANDING IN ANTITRUST CASES
policy of granting standing in antitrust cases would be mandated.
Such a policy, however, is still in the process of evolution.
An examination of cases dealing with standing under the
Clayton Act does not reveal any consistent pattern. However,
two basic tests of "interests sought to be protected" have arisen,
one focusing on the directness of the injury complained of and
the other focusing on the "target" of the violation. Both had
their genesis5 in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co. 6 The plaintiff, a stock-
holder and creditor of a bankrupt corporation, alleged that
the defendant's antitrust violations caused him losses in both
capacities. The court dismissed the suit, holding that the plain-
tiff's injury was "indirect, remote, and consequential,' '7 and
that "[n]o conspiracy or combination against him as a stockholder
or creditor [was] alleged."8 This "direct injury" test (basically,
the proximate cause analysis of tort law) has been employed
to deny standing in antitrust cases to shareholders of an injured
corporation,9 creditors of injured debtors, 10 lessors of injured
lessees,11 and patentees of injured licensees. 2 Implied in the
direct injury analysis is a requirement of privity.
1 3
Currently more favored is the target-area analysis, 14 in
which the plaintiff need only show that he was "within that area
" Pollock, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury and the Passing-On Doctrine, 32 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 12 (1966).
6 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
7 Id. at 709.
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d I (9th Cir.
1963); Bookout v. Schine Chain Theaters, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958); Martens
v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1957). Cf Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roof-
ing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
"0 See, e.g., Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1963); Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); Westmoreland
Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on reargument,
32 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
" See, e.g., Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 890 (1956); United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 F.
574 (2d Cir. 1916); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 685
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 828 (1954).
12 See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America. 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp.. 224
F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
13 Comment, Mangano and the Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Han-
over Doctrine, 72 COLUOI. L. REv. 394, 399 (1972).
14 See, e.g., Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts on
Standing to Sue and Causation under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 ANTITRUST BULL.
351, 359 (1971).
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of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of com-
petitive conditions in a particular industry." 15 Under this anal-
ysis suppliers, 16 employees,' 7  and a shareholder-employee1
8
have been accorded standing. Moreover, in Mulvey v. Samuel
Goldwyn Productions'9 the Ninth Circuit took a broader view,
holding that the target area principle includes plaintiffs whose
injury was reasonably forseeable.
The terms "direct," "remote," "target," and "foreseeable"
are not the most precise, however, and standing under the Clay-
ton Act has traditionally been mired in confusion.20 Determin-
ing who has standing to sue under the antitrust laws is further
complicated by the far-reaching consequences of any interfer-
ence in a complex and interdependent economic system. An
illegal overcharge determined at the manufacturing level can
cause distortions throughout the chain of distribution. Depend-
ing on elasticities of demand, a distributor may be forced to
absorb the extra cost or he may be able to pass part or all of it
along to his customers, who in turn must examine their mar-
kets to determine their own reaction to the increased costs.
It is evident, then, that any antitrust violation which leads to
higher prices generates a number of potential plaintiffs spread
throughout the chain of distribution. Under the terms of sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act, it would seem that any of these poten-
tial plaintiffs should be accorded standing to bring suit. Even a
relatively strict view of the target-area approach could not log-
ically restrict any person in the chain of distribution.2 It is clear
" Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
16 South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d
358 (9th Cir. 1955).
"' Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines. Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699 (D. Colo. 1970); Schroeter
v. Ralph Wilson Plastics, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
IS Schroeter v. Ralph Wilson Plastics, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
19433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971).
'0 For a list of some of the considerations which have entered into standing
decisions, see Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Anti-
trust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30-31
(1971).
"' Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 274 F. Supp.
961 (D. Hawaii 1967). See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp.
59, 71 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal denied, 337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964); McGuire, The Passing-
On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble Damages under Han-
over Shoe, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 177, 183 (1971); Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and
the Piassing-On Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1183, 1188
(1968).
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that such a person's operations would lie "in the area which
it could reasonably be foreseen would be affected by the con-
spiracy.
'"22
Nevertheless, in the wake of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp. 23 there has arisen a theory of standing based
on the presumption that in certain cases plaintiffs who are not
direct purchasers from violators will be faced with such insur-
mountable difficulties of proof that they should not even be
allowed to try to establish their injuries. Although the question
has received the attention of other commentators, a number of
recent cases24 have departed from earlier judicial interpreta-
tions of Hanover Shoe and thus provide a fitting occasion for a
re-examination of the problem.
II. THE IMPACT OF HANOVER SHOE
A. Hanover Shoe and the Passing-On Defense
Hanover Shoe was a private treble-damage action by a shoe
manufacturer against a manufacturer of shoe machinery pur-
suant to section 4 of the Clayton Act. Plaintiff Hanover Shoe
alleged that defendant's policy of leasing, but refusing to sell, its
shoe manufacturing equipment resulted in illegal overcharges in
the price it had to pay to use the machinery. Defendant United
Shoe contended that Hanover was not injured within the terms
of section 4 because it had passed on any overcharge by raising
the price of its shoes. After the lower courts had rejected this
argument,2 5 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider,
inter alia, whether the lower court's rejection of the defense was
proper.
The Court held that rejection of the passing-on defense was
proper. In so concluding, it implicitly recognized the possibility
that a plaintiff who in fact had not been injured might recover.y
22 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir.).
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964).
23 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
24 In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,680
(D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
25 The procedural history of the case is rather interesting. At a special hearing
prior to trial; Judge Goodrich rejected the passing-on defense as a matter of law.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd
per curiam on interlocutory appeal, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901
(1960). Trial resulted in judgment for the plaintiff. 245 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Pa. 1965),
vacated on the issue of damages, 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir.), modified, 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
26 If in the face of the overcharge the buyer does nothing and absorbs the loss,
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The Court employed three separate grounds to support such a
result.
The first was based on the general principal that the "vic-
tim of an overcharge is damaged within the meaning of § 4 to
the extent of that overcharge. '27 This principle was derived by
the Court from a brief examination of five cases decided be-
tween 1906 and 1931: Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v.
City of Atlanta,28 Thomsen v. Cayser,29 Southern Pacific Co. v. Dar-
nell-Taenzer Lumber Co.,30 Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Railway,"
and Adams v. Mills. 32 The Court seemed to rely most upon the
opinions of Justice Holmes in the Chattanooga and Darnell-Taenzer
cases. In Chattanooga the city of Atlanta sought to recover treble
damages for overcharges on the price of iron pipe for its water-
works. The Court affirmed ajudgment for the city for an amount
measured by the difference between the price actually paid
and what the price would have been absent the conspiracy. The
Court reasoned that the city "was injured in its property, at
least, if not in its business of furnishing water, by being led to
pay more than the worth of the pipe. A person whose property
he is entitled to treble damages. This much seems conceded. The reason is
that he has paid more than he should and his property has been illegally
diminished, for had the price paid been lower his profits would have been
higher. It is also clear that if the buyer, responding to the illegal price, main-
tains his own price but takes steps to increase his volume or to decrease other
costs, his right to damages is not destroyed. Though he may manage to main-
tain his profit level, he would have made more if his purchases from the de-
fendant had cost him less. We hold that the buyer is equally entitled to dam-
ages if he raises the price for his own product. As long as the seller continues
to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer more than the law allows.
At whatever price the buyer sells, the price he pays the seller remains illegally
high, and his profits would be greater were his costs lower.
392 U.S. at 489.
This argument is based on the premise either that the plaintiff firm is charging
its customers the highest price possible consistent with producing the highest margin
of profit possible, and that if it passes on the overcharge the result will be a reduction
in profits, or that if, for some economically irrational reason, the plaintiff's price
is lower than it should be and the overcharge does not, therefore, reduce its profits
the plaintiff will still be losing profits it could have been making.
As pointed out by United Shoe, this argument ignores those situations where the
conspiracy affects all of the plaintiff's effective competitors and where the demand
for the product is inelastic. 392 U.S. at 491-92. In that case plaintiff can pass on the
overcharge and suffer no loss. Given inelastic demand, total sales will not decrease;
and given equal effect on all firms at one level, no firm will lose its proportional
share of the market.
27 392 U.S. at 491.
28 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
2$,243 U.S. 66 (1917).
3"245 U.S. 531 (1918).
3 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
32 286 U.S. 397 (1932).
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is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is
injured in his property. '33 Further, "when a man is made
poorer by an extravagant bill we do not regard his wealth as a
unity, or the tort, if there is one, as directed against that unity
as an object. We do not go behind the person of the sufferer.
'34
The reasoning in Chattanooga can be described most chari-
tably as conclusory. However, this dearth of analysis was rem-
edied somewhat in Darnell-Taenzer. That case involved an action
for reparations brought against a railroad by shippers claiming
damages resulting from the railroad's charging of an unreason-
able rate. The defendants argued that the shippers passed on
to their customers the difference between the rate charged and
a reasonable one. The Court replied:
The answer is not difficult. The general tendency of
the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go be-
yond the first step. As it does not attribute remote con-
sequences to a defendant so it holds him liable if proxi-
mately the plaintiff has suffered a loss. The plaintiff
suffered losses to the amount of the verdict when they
paid. Their claim accrued at once in the theory of the
law and it does not inquire into latter events .... The
carrier ought not to be allowed to retain his illegal profit,
and the only one who can take it from him is the one
that alone was in relation with him, and from whom
the carrier took the sum.... Behind the technical mode
of statement is the consideration ... of the endlessness
and futility of the effort to follow every transaction to
its ultimate result .... Probably in the end the public
pays the damages in most cases of compensated torts.35
Thus Holmes' conclusion rests on two observations. First,
the party first in line in the chain of distribution is the only avail-
able plaintiff who can enforce the policy of the antitrust laws
because he is the only party in privity with the violator. 36 Sec-
33 203 U.S. at 396.
31 Id. at 399.
3', 245 U.S. at 533-34.
36 If it be said that the whole transaction is one from a business point of
view, it is enough to reply that the unity in this case is not sufficient to entitle
the purchaser to recover, any more than the ultimate consumer who in turn
paid an increased price. He has no privity with the carrier.
245 U.S. at 534. The Court's deletion of this language from its rather lengthy quo-
tation from the case suggests an intention not to breathe new life into the privity
concept. See 392 U.S. at 490-91 n.8; Comment, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the
Offensive Use of the Passing-On Doctrine, 46 S. CALir L. REV. 98, 110 (1972).
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ond, the offense should be considered complete at the time of
the injury because this is a convenient point at which to end the
examination; therefore, no examination into remote conse-
quences is required. 7
The privity question was not before the Court in Hanover
Shoe and it is extremely doubtful that the Court intended to
reinstate that questionable doctrine as part of antitrust stand-
ing analysis.3 8 Thus, the Holmes decisions were relied upon
mainly as support for the proposition that an examination into
the remote consequences of an injury should be limited. As the
rest of the opinion makes clear, this limitation is justified be-
cause it relieves somewhat the burden placed on the courts by
complicated antitrust cases39 and because inquiry into the plain-
tiff's behavior in consequence of his injury would weaken the
enforcement of the antitrust laws.
40
The Court's second reason for refusing to permit a passing-
on defense was that the task of establishing the preconditions
necessary for its valid application is, effectively, an impossible
one:
A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing
policies. Normally the impact of a single change in the
relevant conditions cannot be measured after the fact;
indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether,
had one fact been different (a single supply less ex-
pensive, general economic conditions more buoyant,
or the labor market tighter, for example), he would
have chosen a different price. Equally difficult to de-
termine, in the real economic world rather than an
economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change
in a company's price will have on its total sales. Finally,
costs per unit for a different volume of total sales are
hard to estimate. Even if it could be shown that the
buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount
3, 245 U.S. at 533-34.
'8 Cases holding that privity is not a requirement under § 4 of the Clayton Act
are numerous. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380
F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton.
360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield
Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955); Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co.,
171 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1948); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 743 (1945); Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320
F. Supp. 699 (D. Colo. 1970); Washington v. General Elec. Co., 246 F. Supp. 960 (W.D.
Wash. 1965).
39 See 392 U.S. at 493.
40 Id. at 494.
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of, the overcharge and that his margin of profit and
total sales had not thereafter declined, there would re-
main the nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating
that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have
raised his prices absent the overcharge or maintained
the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued.
Since establishing the applicability of the passing-on
defense would require a convincing showing of each of
these virtually unascertainable figures, the task would
normally prove insurmountable. 41
Not content with concluding that a defendant could not
prove that the overcharge was passed on even if he tried, the
Court reasoned further that, if the defense were available, de-
fendants would jump at this opportunity to prove the impos-
sible with the result that "[t]reble-damage actions would often
require additional long and complicated proceedings involving
massive evidence and complicated theories.
42
This "problems of proof" rationale lends itself to at least two
interpretations. First, it might be argued that the Court held,
with minor exceptions, 43 that it is impossible for defendants to
prove a pass-on and that this is so as a matter of law. The more
sensible conclusion is that the Court's statement should not be
read too literally and that its primary concern was in insulat-
ing the lower courts from fact-finding burdens that would se-
verely hamper the effectiveness of section 4 as an enforcement
mechanism for the antitrust laws. This second view finds sup-
port in the Court's somewhat disingenuous statement that allow-
ing the pass-on defense would bog down the proceedings in com-
plications, implying that antitrust cases do not otherwise require
"massive evidence and complicated theories."4 4
Given this latter interpretation, the argument can be con-
sidered as a corollary to the Court's third ground for the re-
jection of the defense: the need to protect the effectiveness of
the treble damage remedy. The Court reasoned that to allow the
passing-on defense would remove the best plaintiff from the
controversy and would leave the enforcement of the antitrust
laws to parties with little interest in so doing:
[The] ultimate consumers, in today's case the buyers
of single pairs of shoes, would have only a tiny stake
41 Id. at 492-93 (footnote omitted).
42 Id. at 493.
4' See text accompanying notes 46-48 infra.
44 392 U.S. at 493.
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in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action.
In consequence, those who violate the antitrust laws...
would retain the fruits of their illegality because no one
was available who would bring suit against them. Treble-
damage actions, the importance of which the Court has
many times emphasized, would be substantially re-
duced in effectiveness. 4
5
The Court's indictment of the passing-on defense was not
total, however. The Court indicated that it might approve the
defense in situations where the "overcharged buyer has a pre-
existing 'cost-plus' contract, thus making it easy to prove that
he has not been damaged . ... ,46 The cost-plus contract is an
arrangement by which a party is completely reimbursed for its
costs and is paid a fixed fee above cost as its profit. In such a
case "the considerations requiring that the passing-on defense
not be permitted ... would not be present. '4 7
45 Id. at 494.
4 6 Id.
4 Id. The Court also indicated that the inquiry in price discrimination cases
arising under the Robinson-Patman Act might not be properly measured solely
by reference to the amount of the overcharge.
There is considerable controversy as to the proper measure of damages in a
price discrimination case. Based on a policy of more effective deterrence, the Ninth
Circuit has held that "unless the evidence establishes a greater consequential in-
quiry, discrimination in prices or allowances is entitled to be regarded as constituting
a direct business injury and that the amount thereof thus properly can be made the
basis and measure of a general damage award." Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d
1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1969) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970).
Contra, Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.) (opinion by
L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957) (finding that the measure of damages
is proven loss of business).
The argument for adhering to the Hand formulation in discrimination cases
while holding to the Hanover formula for overcharge cases has been put quite lucidly
by one commentator:
Overcharge cases like Hanover Shoe are readily distinguished from the
Robinson-Patman Act cases. In the former, plaintiff's proof that he was
overcharged because of an antitrust violation is sufficient to establish a prima
facie case. Hanover Shoe simply goes one step farther-it excludes evidence
designed to rebut that case. In the Robinson-Patman context, the disfavored
buyer does not claim that the price which he paid was of itself unlawful; his
grievance is that his competitors were charged a lower price, and that such
price discrimination is unlawful. It does not follow that the disfavored buyer
should be allowed to recover upon a mere showing of price discrimination.
He must also show that the price discrimination enabled a favored com-
petitor to lower its resale price and thus to take business away from him. If
instead the favored competitor merely pocketed the price difference and
refused to lower its resale prices, the disfavored buyer might suffer no in-
jury. [Therefore] such a buyer does not establish a prima facie case when he
establishes a price discrimination.
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B. Passing-On Prior to Hanover Shoe
Hanover Shoe dealt with passing-on as a defense. The prob-
lem under examination here is passing-on as a theory of re-
covery: "offensive passing-on." Before examining the effect of
that case on the right to prove that overcharges were passed on,
it should be helpful to examine the state of the law prior to Han-
over Shoe.
Earlier courts treated the question of an indirect purchaser's
right to sue primarily as one of privity.4 8 In Washington v. Gen-
eral Electric Co.49 the defendants were charged with a conspiracy
which resulted in overcharges for generators used in hydro-
electric projects. The state of Washington sued for treble dam-
ages, alleging that the original purchasers, the general con-
tractors, had passed on the overcharges in their bids for the
hydroelectric project. The defendant manufacturers moved
to dismiss on the ground that there was no privity of contract
between themselves and the plaintiff. The court, unimpressed
with that argument, was "unwilling to deny plaintiff its right
to sue merely because it purchased the equipment through a
third party rather than directly from the manufacturers.
'50
The disputes in Missouri v. Stupp Brothers Bridge & Iron
Co.51 and Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota52 arose in 1964 after
certain structural steel manufacturers pleaded nolo contendere
to government allegations that they had conspired to rig bids
and allocate territories in violation of the Sherman Act. In both
cases the plaintiffs claimed that the resulting overcharges were
passed on to them by the direct purchasers, general contractors,
See McGuire, supra note 21, at 187 n.33.
However, a distinction justified merely on a difference in the requirements of
establishing a prima facie case misses the point. In both situations "injury" is the
sine qua non of a prima facie case. In overcharge cases "injury" is presumed merely
by the fact of the overcharge despite the theoretically valid contention that there may
be no real injury. To, say that price discrimination may not necessarily injure a plain-
tiff and that merely proving a discrimination does not, therefore, establish a prima
facie case is to say nothing more than that the courts should not presume an in-
jury in discrimination cases. Therefore different treatment in establishing the mea-
sure of damages for overcharge and discrimination cases can only be justified by a
finding that the probability of injury is greater in overcharge cases.
48 See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967);
Washington v. American Pipe and Constr. Co., 274 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Wash. 1967);
Missouri v. Stupp Bros. Bridge & Iron Co., 248 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1965); Wash-
ington v. General Elec. Co., 246 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
4. 246 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
5 0 Id. at 962.
51 248 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
52 376 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967).
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in their bid computations on highway projects. In Stupp Brothers
the defendant manufacturers, relying on Darnell-Taenzer, claimed
that the plaintiffs had no right to sue and asked for dismissal.
The court viewed the defendants' argument as based solely on
privity and rejected such notions as not consonant with section
4 of the Clayton Act and the general policy of encouraging pri-
vate actions. Armco was an appeal from a jury award for plain-
tiff on similar facts. The Court employed the target-area test
and had no difficulty finding that plaintiffs had standing.
53
It is significant that none of these cases gave much weight
to the "insurmountable problems of proof" argument. If a plain-
tiff was within the target area of the conspiracy and appeared
willing and able to prove his injury, the courts were willing to
let him try. Indeed, the plaintiff in Armco proved his damages
before a jury and the Eighth Circuit found the evidence suf-
ficient to support the jury award.
54
During the same period, however, the conclusion that pass-
ing-on might be so difficult to prove that defendants should
not be allowed to make the attempt (the notion subsequently
adopted by the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe) was approved
by some courts. For example, in a series of cases55 public util-
ities sued equipment manufacturers for treble damages, alleging
overcharges on purchases. The defendants hoped to show that
the utilities had passed on their increased costs to their users
and submitted a series of interrogatories concerning the eco-
nomic structure of plaintiffs' companies, with particular em-
phasis on rate bases and rates of return. Given that the general
theory of rate setting for public utilities is to allow a reasonable
return to the companies, these interrogatories seemed clearly
relevant. As one commentator pointed out:
One of the costs of service which a utility recovers is
depreciation on capital assets. An appropriate amount
is deducted annually from general revenues and charged
to a depreciation account. If these annual charges are
adequate, the utility will completely recoup amounts
expended for capital equipment by the time the assets
are retired. Since the funds for this charge are derived
5Id. at 210-11.
54 Id.
"5 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203 (7th
Cir. 1964); Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. General Elec. Co., 230 F. Supp. 744 (W.D.
Wash. 1964); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y.),
appeal denied, 337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964).
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from the utility's ratepayers, a utility does, in a sense,
pass on its capital equipment costs . ... 6
The court in Commonwealth Edison v. Allis-Chalmers Manufactur-
ing Co.57 was nevertheless unimpressed. Anticipating the opin-
ion in Hanover Shoe, the court relied heavily on Darnell-Taenzer
58
for the proposition that the overcharge, regardless of passing-on,
was the appropriate measure of damages. The court was also
concerned that the possibility of an ultimate consumer recovery
was nonexistent and that "[t]o apply the pass-on defense in these
circumstances would be tantamount to immunizing defendants
from liability." 59 After stressing the problem of proof, the court
concluded that "if there is to be a windfall, plaintiffs as inno-
cent purchasers should receive it rather than defendants. 60
Defensive passing-on was by no means dead prior to Hanover
Shoe, however. In a group of private suits61 that followed a gov-
ernment prosecution of oil producers for fixing prices, 62 plain-
tiff oil jobbers (middlemen) sought treble damages measured
by the amount of the overcharge to them. The courts, in allow-
ing the passing-on defense,63 seemed especially persuaded by
the fact that the profit margins of the jobbers were guaranteed.
Despite its broad language the Darnell-Taenzer case was uni-
formly distinguished as relevant only to claims brought under
the Interstate Commerce Act.64 The passing-on defense was
16 Note, The "Pass-On" Defense and Regulated Public Utilities, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
1118. 1118-19 (1962).
' 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964).
'8 d. at 205-06.
-" Id. at 208.
60 Id. at 209. Furthermore, the possibilities for retrospective adjustment in the
ratemaking context are extremely limited. See L. SCHWARTZ. FREE ENTERPRISE &
EcoNo~nc ORGANIZATION 732-35 (1972). Thus, it appears unlikely that any recovery
by an electric utility company would be passed on to its consumers.
61 Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967
(7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co.,
119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 655 (1941); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Wis.). appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942).
62 United States v. Standard Oil Co.. 23 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Wis. 1938), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
63 One court implied that the burden of proof was on the plaintiffs to show that
they did not pass on their higher costs. Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F.
Supp. 369, 370 (W.D. Wis. 1942), appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942).
64 Cf. Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 970 (7th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944):
The carrier is bound to establish published rates and, if these prove to be
improper, the shipper is, by statute, in jure proprio, granted the right to
recover .... This remedy, as a matter of law, is lodged only in those in priv-
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also allowed in Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co. 65
The plaintiffs in that case, fruit brokers, alleged that the de-
fendants had charged prices in excess of those allowed under
section 2 of the Clayton Act. Because the brokers operated on a
fixed mark-up arrangement, however, the court found that
they had not been injured in their "business or property.
'66
A review of these cases suggests that the law of defensive
passing-on was not radically altered by Hanover Shoe. Where the
proof of passing-on was difficult, as in the "electrical cases,"
6 7
the defense was not allowed. Where the facts of the case showed a
cost-plus or analogous arrangement, as in the "oil jobber cases"
'68
and Freedman, the defense was allowed. When viewed in this
historical perspective, therefore, the ultimate effect of the Han-
over Shoe opinion should be little more than an affirmation of
these distinctions and, perhaps, a narrowing of the number and
scope of the exceptions to the general policy disfavoring the
defense. As will be demonstrated, however, the state of the law
with regard to the offensive use of passing-on remains unset-
tled and extreme caution must be exercised lest superficial in-
terpretations of Hanover Shoe result in a rule of standing that
needlessly disadvantages indirect purchasers.
C. Offensive Passing-On After Hanover Shoe
Lower court decisions since Hanover Shoe disagreed as to its
effect on the standing of indirect purchasers. 69 The cases de-
ity with the carrier, whereas the action under the Clayton Act is one in tort,
not to recover an overcharge as such, but to collect damages sustained to
plaintiff's property or business.
65 301 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1962).
66 Id. at 833.
67 See note 55 supra.
68 See note 61 supra.
", The following cases held that Hanover Shoe forecloses plaintiffs from showing
passing-on: Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,235 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971); Philadelphia
Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13
(E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nora. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp.,
312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American
Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Cf. Stern v. Lucy Webb
Hayes Nat'l Training School, 367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1973); City of Akron v. Laub
Baking Co., 1972 Trade Cas. 73,930 (N.D. Ohio 1972). In Travis v. Fairmount Foods
Co., 346 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1972). the plaintiffs conceded the issue.
Holding that Hanover Shoe does not restrict standing are: In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re
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nying standing to such plaintiffs have relied on three argu-
ments. First, it is claimed that Hanover Shoe held as a matter of
law that proof of passing-on is impossible absent a cost-plus
or similar fixed markup arrangement.70 Second, it has been
asserted that, through its reliance on Darnell-Taenzer,7 1 Hanover
revived the privity requirement of standing. Third, it is argued
that affording standing to indirect purchasers while denying
the defendant the opportunity to show that a particular pur-
chaser passed on the overcharge would expose defendants to
serious risks of multiple liability.
72
The cases that permit indirect purchasers an opportunity
to show a pass-on attach a markedly different significance to
Hanover Shoe. The courts in these cases see the decision as one
in a long line of cases whose connecting principle is the protec-
tion of the treble-damage remedy as a primary enforcement
mechanism of the antitrust laws. 73 The notion that privity is a
prerequisite to standing is rejected outright. 74 Although the
opinions also generally reject the proposition that Hanover Shoe
held that proof of passing-on is impossible as a matter of law,
the facts in these cases- were stated in a manner suggesting an
attempt to fit them within the cost-plus exception. 75 The mul-
tiple liability problem has generally been skirted as being too
Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. '74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes
v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Southern Gen. Builders,
Inc. v. Maule Indus. Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,484 (S.D. Fla. 1972). Cf. West Virginia
v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971);
Sol S. Turnoff Drug Distrib. Inc. v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische
Industrie, 51 F.R.D. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
7 See, e.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 484
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas.
74.235, at 93.062-63 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Ameri-
can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 25-26 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
7' See, e.g., Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 631 (D. Colo. 1971); Phil-
adelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D.
13, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
72See, e.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 484
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 638 (D. Colo. 1971).
7' See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation 1973-2 Trade
Cas. 74,680, 94,979 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D.
589, 596 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
74, [I]t would be stretching Hanover Shoe beyond all recognition to hold that its
rejection of the passing-on defense somehow returns § 4 of the Clayton Act to the
'days when "privity" was king.... ".Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D.
589, 596 (N.D. Il. 1973).
7"In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 196 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas.
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hypothetical or as being capable of solution through existing
procedural mechanisms.
7 6
D. The Correct Interpretation of Hanover Shoe
As It Relates to Standing
Although legitimate policy considerations exist for denying
standing to indirect purchasers, reliance on Hanover Shoe as a
mandate, or even as a suggestion, for this result is misplaced.
The Court in Hanover Shoe was responding to the legal
argument of a defendant against whom a prima facie case of
liability had already been made out. 77 The holding of the case
is not relevant to the standing of a plaintiff seeking to prove
his injury, and discussion of the case in this context has generally
distorted the debate on the standing issue.
Whatever else might be said of Hanover Shoe, one thing is
certain: it did not hold that privity is a requirement for standing
under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has directly addressed the standing issue in this context only
once, in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 78 (In that case it was held
that the state of Hawaii was precluded from suing in parens
patriae for damage to its general economy caused by violations
of the Act.) To reinstate a privity requirement based on Hanover
Shoe's reliance upon Darnell-Taenzer 79 -a case decided in 1917
which itself had nothing to do with standing or with the Clayton
Act-is to draw a far-reaching conclusion from mere inference
and dicta.
Under the Court's reasoning in Hanover, defendants are
indeed confronted with such severe problems of proof that
it is justifiable to consider their task virtually impossible. This is
so because the Court concluded that defendants must show not
only that the plaintiff passed on the overcharge to his customers,
74,680, at 94,980 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D.
589, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
6In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 201 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade
Cas. 74,680. at 94,979 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D.
589. 596-97 (N.D. I1. 1973).
77The Clayton Act provides that "a final judgment . . . rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the anti-
trust laws ... shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant .... " 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(a) (1970). The government had secured an antitrust judgment against the
defendant United Shoe. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
78 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
7' Text accompanying note 34 supra.
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but also that the plaintiff would not and could not have raised
his prices absent the overcharge.80 As the Court reviewed the
matter,
[t]he mere fact that a price rise followed an unlawful
cost increase does not show that the sufferer of the
cost increase was undamaged. His customers may have
been ripe for his price rise earlier; if a cost rise is merely
the occasion for a price increase a businessman could
have imposed absent the rise in his costs, the fact that
he was earlier not enjoying the benefits of the higher
price should not permit the supplier who charges an
unlawful price to take those benefits from him with-
out being liable for damages. This statement merely
recognizes the usual principle that the possessor of a
right can recover for its unlawful deprivation whether
or not he was previously exercising it.81
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, need only show that their in-
jury was proximately caused by the illegal acts of the defendant.8 2
A plaintiff must introduce evidence that will show with a "rea-
sonable probability"8 3 or with a "fair degree of certainty"8' 4 that
the defendant's illegal acts were a material cause of some dam-
age8 5 to him. The evidence introduced may be circumstantial in
nature.8 6 There is no justification for assuming that a secondary
80 392 U.S. at 493. See, e.g., Wall Prods. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295
(N.D. Cal. 1971). See also McGuire, supra note 21, at 185-86.
81 392 U.S. at 493 n.9.
82 See, e.g., Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885, 887 (4th Cir.
1934); Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 544, 547 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam,
310 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1962).
83 E.V. Prentice Mach. Co. v. Associated Plywood Mills, 252 F.2d 473, 477 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 951 (1958); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392
(9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
84 Momand v. Universal Film Exchs., 172 F.2d 37, 43 (Ist Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 967 (1949).
85 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969).
86 In Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946), the Court
suggested that:
the jury could conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference from
the proof of defendants' wrongful acts and their tendency to injure plaintiffs'
business, and from the evidence of the decline in prices, profits and values,
not shown to be attributable to other causes, that defendants' wrongful acts
had caused damage to the plaintiffs (emphasis supplied).
In a similar setting the Court pointed out that "the injury alleged . . . was pre-
cisely the type of loss that the claimed violations of the antitrust laws would be likely
to cause. The trial court was entitled to infer from this circumstantial evidence that
the necessary causal relation between the . . . conduct and the claimed damage
existed." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine. 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969) (emphasis supplied).
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purchaser cannot meet this burden of proof. First, a plaintiff
located along the chain of distribution need not show that a de-
fendant's illegal overcharge was the sole cause of a price in-
crease in the product purchased by the plaintiff. It is enough to
show that the overcharge was a material factor.8 7 Second, the
plaintiff should be aided, perhaps, by a general presumption
that higher prices at one level in a chain of distribution result
in higher prices at lower levels.
This process of proof is not, of course, a simple one. It can
indeed require "complicated proceedings involving massive evi-
dence and complicated theories."88 However, that fact alone
does not distinguish a plaintiff seeking to prove passing-on
from any other plaintiff involved in a treble-damage action.
Most treble-damage actions are complicated affairs and many
require the use of sophisticated analytical techniques in order
that the probable course of events which would have occurred
absent the illegal acts may be recreated. 89 As one commentator
has pointed out, "the concept of antitrust 'injury' necessarily
consists in large part of hope, projections and blue sky .. .
Thus, an argument that would deny standing to plaintiffs, be-
cause the injuries for which they seek redress are difficult to
prove, proves too much and has widespread implications for the
treble-damage action which the Court in Hanover Shoe could
hardly have intended.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the antitrust laws
express the fundamental economic policy of the nation. 91 It
has also recognized that the private action for treble damages
is of paramount importance in the enforcement of that policy:
92
"[T]he purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring
that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter
87 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 143-44
(1968) (White, J., concurring). This concurrence was cited with approval by the
Zenith court. 395 U.S. at 114 n.9. See also Comment, Monetary Recovery Under Federal
Antitrust Statutes, 45 TEXAs L. REv. 856, 861 (1967).
88 392 U.S. at 493.
8 See generally Lanzillotti, Problems of Proof of Damages in Antitrust Suits, 16 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 329, 330-32 (1971).
10 Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action,
57 Nw. U.L. REv. 691, 695 (1963).
81 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
"2 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969);
Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968); Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965);
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957).
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anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the anti-
trust laws. ' 93 In its rejection of the passing-on defense, Hanover
Shoe's basic aim was to protect the treble-damage remedy. When
viewed in this light, the decision is consistent with a long line
of cases easing the way for private antitrust plaintiffs. 94 It is
not without some irony, therefore, that the case has subsequently
been used as a major weapon against many of these plaintiffs.
As one court has stated: "The attempt to transform a rejection
of a defense because it unduly hampers antitrust enforcement
into a reason for a complete refusal to entertain the claims of
a certain class of plaintiffs seems an ingenious attempt to turn
the decision and its underlying rationale on its head."95
III. WHY Hanover Shoe HAS BEEN MISINTERPRETED
If, as has been argued, Hanover Shoe is so clearly inapplicable
to plaintiffs, the question naturally arises: Why did some courts
nevertheless use the case to deny standing? Although a con-
sideration of that question requires some speculation, the cases
make the answer fairly apparent. First, the courts were concerned
with the serious problem that defendants might be the victims
of multiple liability. Hanover Shoe gave immediate purchasers the
right to recover damages regardless of real injury; if plaintiffs
further along the chain of distribution are also allowed to sue,
the multiple liability problem would seem to follow. Second,
the facts of the cases denying secondary purchasers standing
suggest that the courts had serious doubts that plaintiffs were
presenting manageable and meritorious actions. 96 Hanover Shoe
may have served as a handy peg upon which to hang these con-
cerns. It is the thesis of this Comment that the problem of mul-
tiple liability is amenable to solution, and that tampering with
the theory of standing is not a satisfactory answer to the prob-
lem of manageability.
A. The Problem of Multiple Liability
The decisions that afford standing to secondary purchasers
have not supplied totally satisfactory solutions to the problem
of multiple liability. The courts in Boshes v. General Motors Corp. 97
93 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
" See cases cited note 92 supra.
"5 In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,680, at 94,978-79
(D. Conn. 1973).
"'See text accompanying notes 118-21 infra.
I7 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. 111. 1973).
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and In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation98 were not particularly
troubled by the problem, believing that the mere hypothetical
possibility of multiple recovery was not of sufficient importance
to be considered at a preliminary stage of the litigation.99 More-
over, both courts were convinced that such procedural devices as
statutory interpleader, the statute of limitations, or the doctrine
of collateral estoppel would suffice to ameliorate the problem.100
At best, however, the availability of these devices presents
only a partial answer. Statutory interpleader' 0 1 is a device by
which defendants can bring all claimants into a single forum
and require them to litigate inter se the proper distribution of
the fund. However, as has been pointed out by one commenta-
tor,10 2 interpleader may not be either a fair or a practical alterna-
tive for defendants. That a defendant has the option of inter-
pleading may, in some instances, do no more than offer him the
Hobson's choice of either attempting to construct a complex
class action by bringing in the ultimate consumers of his prod-
uct and paying a bond for the amount in controversy a0 3 or risk-
ing the payment of damages to each potential plaintiff in a line
of distribution. Moreover the whole attempt could come to
naught if it is found that the class action is not a manageable
one.'0 4 Finally, interpleader is useful only where the defendant
is willing to concede the antitrust violation and the amount of
the damages is clear.
1 0 5
Under the relevant statute of limitations, plaintiffs have
four years to commence suit following the accrual of the cause
of action.' 0 6 That, as a practical matter, plaintiffs will sleep on
their rights and be time-barred from bringing an action is not
a theoretically satisfactory answer to the problem of multiple
liability. The Boshes and Master Key courts were able to rely on
91 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973).
q' 59 F.R.D. at 596-97; 1973-2 Trade Cas. at 94,979.
100 59 F.R.D. at 596-97; 1973-2 Trade Cas. at 94,979.
101 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
102 McGuire, supra note 21, at 197.
103 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2) (1970); 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 22.10 (2d ed.
1974).
104 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156 (1974).
05 See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2) (1970).
106 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1970). The statute is suspended during the pendency of a
government proceeding and a year thereafter. However, the action must be brought
within four years of the accrual of the action or within the suspension period. 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(b) (1970).
STANDING IN ANTITRUST CASES
the statute because of the particular facts of the litigations in-
volved, but such will not always be the case.
The most startling suggestion made by the Boshes and Master
Key courts is that defendants will be protected from multiple
liability by operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in cases
where the secondary purchaser sues first. "[A] jury finding that
an overcharge had been passed-on, particularly by a party in
contractual privity with the alleged antitrust violator, would
preclude relitigation of the same issue by the 'passing-on' party
(e.g. the initial purchaser) who is higher up in the distribution
chain."' 0 7 However, although Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of Illinois Foundation'0 8 held that estoppel may be asserted
against a party in privity with a party in a prior action on the
same facts, the mere fact that primary and secondary purchasers
have business contracts hardly provides the necessary identity
of interest which would justify denying the primary purchaser
his day in court.10 9 A more persuasive argument could, per-
haps, be made by appealing directly to the policies underlying a
determination of collateral estoppel: that the defendant in a suit
brought by a secondary purchaser has substantially similar in-
terests in combatting an allegation of passing-on as would the
primary purchaser, were he a party to the litigation. Further-
more, he has little to lose in doing so, since Hanover Shoe bars
him from asserting a pass-on as a defense to the claim of the pri-
mary purchaser. On the other hand, a jury finding that the over-
charge was passed on is of questionable relevance to the right
of a primary purchaser to recover. In this instance the Hanover
Shoe presumption that the measure of damages is the amount
of the overcharge seems inapplicable. That the primary pur-
chaser raised his prices in response to an overcharge does not
mean he did not suffer injury. 10
B. Apportionment of Damages Among Potential Plaintiffs
In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases,"' the Ninth Circuit con-
fronted the issue directly. It granted various states and munici-
palities standing to sue for overcharges that originated at the
manufacturing level and which were allegedly passed on by
107 Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
108402 U.S. 313 (1971).
109 IB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.411[1] (2d ed. 1974).
110 See note 27 supra.
'" 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919.
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road contractors in their bids for highway projects. Since some
of the contractor-primary purchasers were involved in the action,
the court felt obliged to advise the lower court on the proper
method of allocating damages:
[T]he amount of the overcharge is not necessarily the
total amount of harm to plaintiffs. Purchasers may also
have been damaged by being forced to turn to sub-
stitute goods, or to discontinue purchasing the price-
fixed product. The essence of conspiracy is that the
conspirators believe they will recover more from the
illegal overcharge than they will lose from diminished
sales. Hanover Shoe .. . indicates that the measure of
damages includes lost profits. Thus, in passing-on
cases, the intermediary should recover the amount of
the overcharge that was not passed on, if the proof
shows that the ultimate consumer did not pay it all,
and any lost profits resulting from increased costs.
The ultimate purchasers should obtain the remainder
of the overcharge, and any other damages proximately
caused. 112
This approach has the advantage of promoting a just appor-
tionment of the overcharges in a context where everyone recovers
his proven damages and the wrongdoer gets his just deserts.
It is subject, however, to the criticism that it limits the general
principle established by Hanover Shoe, that primary purchasers
are entitled to recover the entire amount of the overcharge with-
out regard to any pass-on." 3 Nevertheless, Hanover Shoe did
not address the situation where both primary and secondary
purchasers are involved as plaintiffs, and deviance from the
general principle of damages stated in that case, seems justified
where the policies of deterrence and compensation can be ac-
commodated.
An apportionment similar to that suggested in In re Western
Liquid Asphalt Cases should suffice in cases where both primary
and secondary purchasers are involved as plaintiffs. To promote
a more equitable apportionment of the damages, therefore,
courts should not hesitate to allow intervention 1 4 by secondary
purchasers in actions brought by the primary purchasers and,
of course, vice versa.
112Id. at 200-01.
13 392 U.S. at 491.
S11 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
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Where the primary purchasers bring their actions first and
no secondary purchasers have intervened, secondary purchas-
ers who bought from primary purchasers that recovered should
be barred from bringing their actions against the original defen-
dant for the express reason of avoiding double liability. 15 Al-
though this result might be criticized, it is less harsh than that
contemplated by those courts that deny standing to all secon-
dary purchasers. Of course, secondary purchasers would be
granted standing if no party in their particular chain of distribu-
tion had recovered. Moreover, once a party secures a judgment
the recovery should be safe from further actions by parties fur-
ther down the chain of distribution. Otherwise primary pur-
chasers may hesitate to sue, fearing that their recovery will be
significantly diminished by parties waiting on the sidelines who
have not shared the costs of litigation. As emphasized by the
Court in Hanover Shoe, primary purchasers are usually the best
plaintiffs to ensure the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and,
in view of recent decisions defining the burdens of managing
a large class action, in some cases they may effectively be the
only plaintiffs available.
Where secondary purchasers sue first and obtain a judg-
ment without intervention by primary purchasers, several solu-
tions seem possible. First, primary purchasers might be barred
from bringing suit against the defendant on the ground that
double recovery might otherwise ensue. Such a rule might have
the added effect of encouraging the supposedly best plaintiff,
the primary purchaser, to enter the litigation at an early stage.
But less drastic alternatives are available. Primary purchasers
could be limited in their recovery to proven lost profits and not
be allowed to rely on the amount of the overcharge as the mea-
sure of damages. This course, however, runs counter to the de-
cision in Hanover Shoe insofar as it creates an irrefutable pre-
sumption that the amount of the overcharge is the appropriate
measure of damages. As was suggested earlier, Hanover Shoe
need not be read as establishing an absolute rule for the mea-
sure of damages. Indeed, this situation might be viewed in the
same light as the cost-plus exception. The danger of multiple
liability can also be avoided if the defendant exercises his op-
tion of statutory interpleader. The difficulties that attach to
the use of interpleader have already been noted. 116 Finally,
"i' See McGuire, supra note 21, at 198.
116 See text accompanying notes 10 1-05 supra.
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and perhaps most satisfactorily, the burden could be shifted
to the defendant. If sued by a secondary purchaser, a defendant
could join the primary purchaser that sold to the plaintiff-the
only instance where multiple liability is possible-as a party
necessary for a just adjudication of the matter. 1 7 This might
expose the defendant to a larger total liability, but the decision
is his own and if no joinder is made, he should not later be heard
to complain of multiple liability.
C. Problems of Proof and Standing Revisited
The question remains whether it is ever justifiable to assume
that plaintiffs cannot prove their cases' 18 and therefore to deny
them standing. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radi-
ator and Standard Sanitary Corp.119 is on point in this regard.
The plaintiffs in that case were homeowners who claimed that
they were entitled to recover illegal overcharges by manufac-
turers of plumbing fixtures which were used in the construction
of their houses. The alleged chain of distribution extended from
the defendants to wholesalers to contractors to builders to prior
homeowners to the plaintiffs. The court dismissed the case,
stating that:
[i]t would be incredible if the price of a house were de-
termined not by the shifts in supply in [sic] demand in
the market for homes as a whole but rather by a rela-
tively miniscule change (with regard to the selling price
of the house) in the price of the plumbing fixtures. If
the Supreme Court regarded the figures underlying
corresponding assumptions as "virtually unascertain-
able" and applied such adjectives as "insuperable"
and "insurmountable" to any attempt to support them
in that case, it certainly follows afortiori that insuper-
able difficulties inhere in the premises underlying the
claims at issue in the instant case.'
20
One would be hard put to argue with this perception of the
case and, given the present burden on our court system, it is easy
to sympathize with the result. The facts of Philadelphia Housing
Authority, however, present the most extreme case imaginable.
117 FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
"'See text accompanying notes 80-90 supra.
I, 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub non. Mangano v. American Radiator
& Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
120 Id. at 26.
STANDING IN ANTITRUST CASES
To transform its conclusion into a rule of law governing the
standing of secondary purchasers would, therefore, reach too
far; the facts of the next case may be far less compelling.
The difficulties that inhere in making such an a priori as-
sesgment of the problems of proof in this setting are further
demonstrated by the conflicting decisions in the "asphalt cases."
In City and County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 121 plaintiffs alleged
that defendant oil companies had conspired to fix the price of
asphalt. Plaintiffs claimed that the illegal overcharge was passed
on to them through the bids of general contractors employed in
various highway projects. The court dismissed the suit, citing
a lack of privity. 122 The court also expressed concern, however,
with what it considered to be extremely difficult problems of
proof:
The difficulty in tracing any overcharge for asphalt
into a completed job will vary from job to job. On a re-
paving job, the cost of asphalt would have to be broken
out of the paving bid, and inquiry would have to be
made as to how that cost influenced the bid. This would
not be simple, but, as compared to tracing the cost of
asphalt into the cost of a 10-mile stretch of a new high-
way blasted out of the Colorado mountains, the prob-
lem would be child's play.1
2 3
On essentially similar facts, the court in In re Western Liquid As-
phalt Cases124 reached exactly the opposite conclusion. Despite
the fact that the district court had clearly expressed its opinion
that the problems of proof were similar in their complexity
to those presented by the facts in Hanover Shoe, 125 the court found
no overwhelming problems of proof. In its view the facts sug-
gested a situation much like the cost-plus exception cited in
Hanover Shoe. 1
26
The asphalt cases point up the danger of determining, on
the pleadings, that a certain set of facts cannot be proven. If
standing is to be determined according to a judge's a priori
notion of the difficulty of proof, the result is likely to be a morass
of contradictory opinions and impenetrable distinctions. Cer-
121 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971).
, 22 Id. at 631.
23 Id. at 636-37.
124 487 F.2d 191 (1973). cert, denied. 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
125 In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases. 350 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
126 487 F.2d at 196.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:976
tainty therefore requires that passing-on as a theory of recovery
either be accepted or rejected in toto. It has been the thesis of
this Comment that the policies of encouraging enforcement of
the antitrust laws and of compensating the victims of their viola-
tion support acceptance.
IV. CONCLUSION
In an era when the public enforcement of the antitrust laws
is largely problematical, 127 private enforcement proceedings be-
come increasingly important.1 28 Therefore any burden on pri-
vate actions should be imposed only upon compelling considera-
tions.
There are no compelling considerations which would justify
denying standing to indirect purchasers merely because they
are indirect purchasers. Hanover Shoe does not address the ques-
tion and, when read in the context of other cases decided by
the Court, leans more toward granting standing than toward
denying it. Moreover, the policy considerations which led some
of the lower courts to deny standing should not overcome the
weight that should be accorded to the policy of promoting en-
forcement. The problem of multiple liability is subject to solu-
tion. Although the problem of the judicial burdens caused by
plaintiffs seeking to show a pass-on may in some cases be signif-
icant, the burdens are not particularly different from those
involved in any complicated antitrust proceeding.
12i See generally M. GREEN, B. MOORE & B. WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE
SYSTEM (1972).
128 See address by Richard IV. McLaren before the Antitrust Committees of the
Federal Bar Association and the Philadelphia Bar Association, Dec. 11, 1969, quoted
in Parker, Treble Damage Action-A Financial Deterrent to Antitrust Violations? 16 ANTITRUST
BULL. 483 (1971).
